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Dorothée Cambou
Political security is a crucial component of human security. The concept
underlies and crosscuts all other aspects of human security. However, it is also
poorly deﬁned and the topic is not well addressed from a Barents perspective.
In this regard, the purpose of the following analysis is to deﬁne and assess con-
temporary political security challenges in the Barents Region. In this assessment,
the study more speciﬁcally argues that political security is intertwined with
democracy and human rights but that some issues and concerns subsist in the
Barents Region notably in relation to the respect and protection of the rights of
citizens, the rights of indigenous peoples and the preservation of the peace and
security in the region following the impacts of the Ukrainian crisis.
1 Deﬁnition
Originally the concept of political security was ‘not widely used or accepted
in social studies’ (United Nations Development Programme 1990, 3). It is
also a concept that is imprecise and ambivalent. Nevertheless, it has also been
more recently considered that political society remains a ‘relevant concept for
gathering concerns in the political action’ (Costa 2008, 568). In this regard, it
is important to clarify the concept in order to ensure a more informed debate
about its use and implementation.
Traditionally, political security has been loosely deﬁned in reference to the
protection of basic human rights. In this regard, political security must be
distinguished from national security, which essentially focuses on the protection
of the nation and the values espoused by the national society. Political security
is concerned with the rights of individuals and peoples, not those of the states
or nations. In its 1994 report, the UNDP indicates more precisely that political
security is one of the most ‘important aspects of human security’ and includes
the protection of people against ‘political repression, systematic torture, ill
treatment or disappearance’ as well as ‘political detention and imprisonment’
(United Nations Development Programme 1990, 32). In accordance with this
interpretation, political security therefore encompasses the defence of individuals
against any form of political repression or human rights abuses. A predominant
focus on repression is, however, insuﬃcient in comprehensively addressing the
issue of political security. While political security necessarily entails the nega-
tive obligation of the state to refrain from interfering with basic individual
freedoms, it also includes positive obligations for national authorities to take
necessary measures to safeguard basic political rights (Hokkanen v. Finland,
24 August 1994).1 The protection of such rights include the freedom to vote,
freedom of speech, freedom of press, the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief, and the freedom of movement. These rights are protected
under international law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratiﬁed by 184 states around the
world. In this sense, political security also ensures people’s ability to take part
in the political life of the society to which they belong therefore sustaining a
democratic governance system.
In this sense, political security is closely intertwined with democratic gov-
ernance: ‘democracy provides the political foundation necessary to sustaining
all other dimensions of security’ (Young 2002). Similarly, political security
involves ‘support to transition to democratic practices’, a view also shared
by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UN Human Security
Unit 2009, 21). There is also a growing consensus under international law
that only in a democratic system can individuals fully exercise their human
rights. Conversely, ‘only when human rights are respected can democracy
ﬂourish’ (European Commission 2013). Thus, human rights and democracy
are inextricably related and mutually reinforcing. Democratic governance
provides the framework, institutions and process to uphold a state’s responsi-
bility to safeguard the rights and needs of the population. On the other hand,
human rights provide a set of values that inform the content of democratic
governance and sustain political security. In practice, achieving the ambitions
of political security has therefore become tied to the promotion of democracy
and human rights.
The links between democratic governance and human rights are enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and further developed in the
ICCPR, which recognises a host of political rights and civil liberties under-
pinning meaningful democracies. More speciﬁcally, article 25 of the Covenant
recognises and protects the right of every citizen ‘to take part in the conduct
of public aﬀairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have
access to public service’. According to the Human Rights Committee, which
is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the
ICCPR by its State parties, ‘Article 25 lies at the core of democratic govern-
ment based on the consent of the people’ (General Comment No 25, 1996,
para.2). However, democracy does not only centre on the electoral process.
The deﬁnition of democracy must be holistic and encompass procedural
and the substantive elements. In other words, democratic governance must
ensure that the outcomes of elections are representative of the people. It must
also ensure that the will of peoples is freely exercised, and that all individuals
can participate in political aﬀairs free from discrimination. Democracy also
implies the establishment of governance structures, which ensure freedom of
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expression and access to information, as well as guarantees the right to freedom
of association and peaceful assembly. Democracy is thus an intersectional
issue. It enjoins all political rights and freedoms necessary to ensure ‘the
freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic,
social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their
lives’ (UN General Assembly 2009).
Whereas democracy originally focused on the individual rights of citizens
to freely participate in electoral processes without discrimination, democracy
also ‘entails a principle that everyone whose basic interests are aﬀected by
policies should be included in the process of making them’ (Young 2002). In
this regard, the concept of democracy has now become more inclusive and
implies the participation of minorities and indigenous peoples groups in
the decision-making processes that aﬀect them. More particularly, ensuring the
engagement of indigenous peoples and their organisations has now become
critical for preventing, resolving conﬂicts and enhancing democratic govern-
ance (UNDP 2001). In this regard, the study of democracy as a governance
framework involves the collective inclusion of indigenous peoples and minor-
ity groups in decision-making processes concerning them and their right to
participate in the governance of their traditional land and natural resources.
This conceptualisation of democracy is far-reaching, and is further entrenched
within the intersections between political security and personal and community
security (see chapters 2.7 and 2.8).
Alongside the extension of its subject, the extension of the concept of
democracy outside the framework of the state polity is also increasingly taken
into account. As postulated by Grigorescu, during these last decades, democratic
norms have spread from domestic politics to intergovernmental organisations
(IGOs) (Grigorescu 2015). Democratic values inﬂuence the institutional
design and work of intergovernmental organisations such as the UN. In eﬀect,
democracy is now one of the universal and indivisible core values and prin-
ciples of the United Nations. Thus the contemporary deﬁnition of democracy
must be inclusive and comprehensive. It concerns the decision-making pro-
cesses that involve formal institutions and informal processes; people of all
genders, majorities and minorities; governments and civil society; and
includes institutions at the national, local and international levels.
While it is ‘obvious that democracy, or the installation of democratic
regimes, is a component of political security’ (Costa 2008, 562), democracy
remains ﬂexible and is set on open-texture political values. As noted by the
UN, ‘democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of
people’. Moreover, it is also recognised as well that, while these norms and
standards are both universal and essential to democracy, there is no one
model of democracy (General Assembly resolution 62/7). Indeed, the ideal of
democracy is rooted in philosophies and traditions from many regions of the
world. While the western standards of democracy have a value for the new
democracies, the democratic ideal should integrate and suits local conditions
and particularities (Beetham et al. 2008). In this regard, securing democratic
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governance as a means to ensure political security can be pursued through
diverse routes. This diversity has cast some doubts on whether any form of
democracy can always provide political security for all. It is also questionable
to which extent the standards of universal democracy can/are truly being
dissociated from western values in practice.
Nonetheless, because democracies are less conﬂict-prone than non-
democracies (e.g. Russett and Oneal 2001) and democratising countries with
well-managed transitions are less likely to be engaged in interstate warfare
(Landman 2005), ensuring democratic governance continues to be a main
element in enhancing political security. Ultimately, the promotion of
democracy as a means to ensure political security must therefore be valued
and contextualised in accord with the population that invokes it.
2 Contextualisation
Preserving and maintaining political security requires democratic governance.
However, ‘democratization is a process that requires time and patience’, and
which must ‘be built from within societies’ and ‘cannot be imported, or exported,
but supported’ (Beetham et al. 2008, 7). As noted in the 1993 Barents declara-
tion, the Barents institutions were established to meet this need: to support
‘the ongoing process of reform in Russia which aims, inter alia, at strength-
ening democracy, market reforms, and local institutions, and which is there-
fore important for closer regional co-operation in the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region’. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the
situation in Russia and its relation with Nordic countries changed. During
this period, the discourse on political security also shifted from traditional
security, which concerns the protection of the state, military issues and war, to
a focus on human security and the needs of the Barents population. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation begun its transition to
democracy. In line with democratising principles, the Russian Federation
pursued renewed cooperation with its European neighbours, notably increasing
its cooperation with Nordic states through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.
In 1996, the Russian Federation acceded to the Council of Europe, the oldest
European institution and main protector of rule of law, human rights and
democracy on the old continent ‘on the basis of its democratic progress,
taking into account the particular circumstances following the fall of the
Soviet Union.’ (Bindig 2010, 35; Massias 2007, 6; Stahl 2011, 176).
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, support for democratic development has
become a vital aspect of Barents cooperation. According to the Norwegian
Barents secretariat, the Barents cooperation is considered ‘as an integral part
of creating a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe’, which brings
‘administrative structures closer to the citizens and to improve the democratic
functions of society’ (The Norwegian Barents Secretariat 2017). This recog-
nition of the common democratic values of the region are also present in the
1993 Kirkenes Declaration and in reference to several other documents
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published under the auspices of the Barents cooperation.2 In 2013, the Kir-
kenes Declaration reiterated that the Barents cooperation is ‘a unique under-
taking that conﬁrms the value of close interaction between intergovernmental
cooperation, cooperation among county administrations and direct people-to-
people cooperation’ that seeks to develop its ‘societies in full respect of inter-
nationally recognised principles for ensuring sustainable development’. Thus,
the achievements of the last two decades have been the development of closer
cooperation between local and regional initiatives by Barents communities
and institutions, as well as the increase in activities across sectors such as
business and civil society (Kirkenes Declaration 2013). In this regard, the
regional framework has successfully strengthened cooperation between
governance mechanisms.
Despite this progress, the democratic transition of the whole Barents
Region remains incomplete. In its 2015 concluding observation report, the
Human Rights Committee expressed its continuous concern regarding the
Russian Government’s failure to ensure freedom of expression and freedom of
association, as well as to combat the rise of racism, xenophobia, Islamopho-
bia and anti-Semitism, and to eradicate torture and ill treatment (Human
Rights Committee 2015). Today, the Russian Federation also continues to
have the largest number of pending cases before the European Court of
Human Rights. Moreover,
the examination of recent developments in the ﬁeld democratic transition
at local and regional level has shown that Russia, despite ﬁrst positive
signs at the beginning of the reforms in 2000, has still not been able to
meet the obligations it committed to when acceding to the CoE.
(Stahl 2011)
Although this issue mainly concerns Russia, it also has implications for
the Barents Region. In 2017, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, a non-
governmental organisation that works to promote respect for human rights,
requested ‘Norwegian authorities to increase the emphasis on democracy
and human rights in the Russian part of the Barents Region,’ because ‘on
the Russian side, the human rights problems remain very severe’ (Human
Rights House 2007). In addition, studies like the Freedom in the World
survey for 2017 notes a continued decline in Russia in the ﬁeld of political
rights and civil liberties, notably ‘due to the heavily ﬂawed 2016 legislative
elections, which further excluded opposition forces from the political pro-
cess’ (Freedom House 2017a). Similarly, the Nations in Transit survey for
2017 indicates a low Russian performance when it comes to national
democratic governance, electoral processes, civil society, independent media,
local democratic governance, independence and corruption (Freedom House
2017b). Altogether, a low performance on these elements represent an
important threat to the democracy and the political security of Russian
citizens.
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In contrast to the Russian Federation, the Nordic countries are among the
champions of human rights and democracy. For many years, Norway,
Sweden and Finland have shared the top positions on several democracy
analyses (Global Democracy Ranking 2015; The Economist 2016; Freedom
House 2017a). Yet, the Nordic countries are not entirely exempt from political
insecurity concerns. The consolidation of democracy and the safeguard of
human rights are continuous processes. As indicated by minister of foreign
aﬀairs Børge Brende, human rights and rule of law are central components of
good democratic governance:
human rights provide a framework for identifying and addressing
inequalities and thus ensuring that no one is left behind. This includes
safeguarding the rights of those who are hardest to reach – the most
vulnerable and marginalised groups, including indigenous peoples and
persons with disabilities.
(Brende 2014)
The recognition and protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples in the
Nordic counties remains nonetheless a major issue. The protection of the
rights of the Sámi people, and their inclusion in the democracy of their
respective states, implies the recognition and implementation of their right to
self-determination. This has yet to occur in practice (Anaya 2011; Tauli-
Corpuz 2016). Whereas the economic and social situation of the Sámi people
is better than it is for many other indigenous peoples around the world, the
Sámi in the Nordic countries continue to face major human rights challenges
that aﬀect their political security as a distinct people living in western demo-
cratic states (Multiculturalism Policy Index 2010).
Finally, political security is interconnected with peace and stability. How-
ever, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Eastern Ukraine have
raised questions about the Russian Federation’s governmental relationship
with European countries. This event also incurred great speculations about
conﬂict in the Barents Region that could threaten the political security of its
population.
With this context in mind, the purpose of the next section is to assess some
of the issues that currently challenge the democratic order of the Barents
Region and the political security of its population.
3 Assessment
There are many political security challenges that can be identiﬁed in the
Barents Region. While such challenges are complex and interconnected, it is
possible to narrow the scope of insecurity issues to three main components.
The ﬁrst component concerns the protection of democratic rights, which
includes safeguards on the rights of individual citizens to vote, and their other
political freedoms. The second component concerns the collective rights of
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indigenous peoples, their inclusion in decision-making process and the exercise
of their right to self-determination. The last component concerns the stability
of the region and the geopolitical relations between the Russian Federation
and its neighbouring countries, as well as the preservation of cooperation
across the borders of the Barents Region.
The following section subsequently analyses each component as a challenge
to political security in the Barents Region.
3.1 Political rights and freedoms
In the Barents Region, the consolidation and strengthening of democracy is an
on-going process. This process entails the protection of the right to vote and the
guarantee of political freedoms at all levels of the decision-making process.
The right to vote in national, regional and local elections is crucial to
ensure the establishment of representative institutions in a democracy, because
the authority of the government derives itself from the consent of the governed.
According to statistics from Patchwork Barents,3 the voter turnout in the
latest elections to national, regional and local legislative assemblies, as well as
in regional parliament elections, varies substantially within the Barents
Region. National elections are much more popular among Barents citizens,
with a turn out ranging from 50% in Argnaglesk Oblast to 87.5% in Vaster-
botten (Ulyanova 2015). Also, whereas Sweden had a voter turnout of over
80% in regional elections, all other regions in Norway, Finland and Russia
registered considerably lower participation. In Arkhangelsk Oblast, only
20.99% of the electorate participated in the gubernatorial elections and in
Murmansk Oblast, the average turnout throughout the regional elections was
23.10%. In contrast, elections held in the Republic of Karelia in 2011 gath-
ered a turnout of 44.4%, and in the Komi Republic in 2015, this ﬁgure was
44.2%. At the regional level, Finnish and Norwegian voters were also more
active voters. The latest (2012) turnout ﬁgures for Lapland and Northern
Ostrobothnia were 60.6 and 56.5%. In Norway, according to NRK,4 the local
election turnout in Nordland, Troms and Finnmark was 59.8, 58.9 and 58.1%
respectively in 2015. In comparison with previous elections, the turnout in
Norway was, however, signiﬁcantly lower than in the previous elections
organised in 2011, which gathered a turnout of 63.4, 64.6 and 61.7% voters
across the three counties respectively. Thus, the participation of citizens in the
electoral process has been decreasing, though this is probably also reﬂective of
a global crisis of trust in the democratic process.
However, while all modern democracies hold elections, not all elections are
democratic. In order to ensure democratic elections, all citizens should be
entitled to exercise their right to vote free from discrimination. Genuine and
periodic elections are also essential to ensure the accountability of repre-
sentatives for the exercise of the legislative or executive powers vested in
them. In accordance with Article 25 ICCPR, ‘such elections must be held at
intervals which are not unduly long and which ensure that the authority of
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government continues to be based on the free expression of the will of electors.’
According to the HRC, reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may
also ‘be justiﬁed where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters
is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate
expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party’ (HRC 1996, para. 19).
In the Russian Barents, however, irregularities have been noted which
question the democratic nature of national and local elections. According to
the independent election watchdog, Golos,5 ‘the main problems in Russian
elections are connected with the activities of state oﬃcials on both national
and local level. The oﬃcials actively use their available administrative resources
to promote party interests in public events and the media’ (Staalesen 2016).
These irregularities were especially reported in Arkhangelsk, which was one of
the regions with the biggest number of registered oﬀences.
Another issue of concern in the Barents Region concerns youth. Whereas
the interests of young people and their involvement in diﬀerent regional
activities is essential to strengthening civil society and democracy in the
Barents Region,6 the lack of engagement of youth in political aﬀairs is suﬃ-
ciently signiﬁcant to be reported. In Norway, it has been noted that the
number of ﬁrst-time voters (18–21 years) practising their right to vote in local
elections dropped from 53% in 1971 to below 30% in 2007 (Dalhaug 2012,
77). Voter turnout among youth is also lower than among adults in both local
and national parliament elections, and the number of young members in
Norwegian political parties has also fallen from about 44.000 in 1977 to
23.000 in 1995.7 Russia is experiencing similar disproportionality, with ﬁgures
in 2007 from the Komi Republic showing that 37.3% of the population aged
18–30 years took part in the regional elections, 49.6% in elections to the State
Duma and 58% in presidential elections. While the lack of political engagement
in young people through participation in elections should not be overstated,
according to Dalhaug, project manager for the Barents Youth project at the
Norwegian Barents in 2003, ‘the low number of young people involved in
political activity in more conventional forms calls for concern’ (Dalhaug
2012, 77). More particularly, the low number of political youth organisations
and the low number of youth representatives in local and regional constituencies
can undermine the representative outcome of political decision-making pro-
cesses and their relevance for youth. As noted by the Barents Youth Council,
‘youth need experience in democratic decision-making processes to under-
stand the beneﬁts of democratic societies’ (BEAC Youth Working Group
2011). In this regard, youth involvement in the Barents Region must be
strengthened through their inclusion in decision-making processes and
through increased support for youth engagement in NGOs and media, in
order to foster active citizenship and a plural democratic process.
Finally, participation in electoral processes is no panacea for democracy.
Beyond participation in the political processes, it is also important to ensure
that all citizens beneﬁt from their political freedoms. However, the democracy
scores and regime ratings of the country of Russia continue to raise general
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concern, which also aﬀects the political security of the Barents population.
According to the Freedom of House’s 2017 report, Russia’s democratic score
is declining. More particularly, the organisation argues that ‘the regime sought
to perfect its authoritarian control over Russian citizens and the economy in
order to prevent any real democratic changes’ (Freedom House 2017b). To
some extent, those conclusions are consistent with the 2014 HRC conclusions
on Russia’s State report, which stresses the need for the government to take
all necessary measures to ensure that individuals fully enjoy their freedom of
speech and the expression of dissenting political opinion, their right to
peaceful assembly and their freedom of association (HRC 2015, para 18–22).
In particular, government measures to suppress political dissent and the
‘reports of harassment, violence and killing of lawyers, journalists, human
rights defenders and opposition politicians’ have raised strong concern in
Russia (HRC 2015, para 18–19). In relation to peaceful assembly, the HRC
also expressed concern
about consistent reports of arbitrary restrictions on the exercise of freedom
of peaceful assembly, including violent and unjustiﬁed dispersal of pro-
testers by law enforcement oﬃcers, arbitrary detentions and imposition of
harsh ﬁnes and prison sentences for the expression of political views.
(HRC 2015, para. 21)
Concerning the freedom of association, the Committee also worried about
‘restrictions on the operations of NGO activities and to suspension or voluntary
closure of some NGOs’ (HRC 2015, para. 22). The right to free association
and peaceful assembly are, however, essential in conjunction to the rights of
individuals to participate in political aﬀairs, and are protected under article
25 of the ICCPR. In this regard, it is required of states to ensure that basic
freedoms are protected in their internal management, in order to enable citi-
zens to fully exercise their democratic rights. In the absence of fully-ﬂedged
protection of such rights, the political security of citizens living in the Russian
Federation remains consequently pale in comparison to the situation aﬀorded
to the population in the Nordic countries.
3.2 Inclusion and self-determination
While it is fundamental to ensure that individual citizens can fully exercise
their democratic rights, it is also crucial to ensure that all peoples participate
in political life and are active decision-makers – especially indigenous peoples.
This is essential to overcome historical inequalities and discrimination. However,
in the Barents, the inclusion of indigenous peoples in the democratic system
remains an ongoing issue in all four states.
In the Nordic states, the recognition and protection of the rights of the
Sámi people has made some progress in the last thirty years. This includes the
establishment of a Sámi assembly in each of the three Nordic countries to
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represent the Sámi community at the domestic level, which also exercises
certain competencies in the decision-making process aﬀecting the Sami liveli-
hoods. It also includes the adoption of multiple national regulations and
legislations to ensure the protection of the cultural rights of the Sámi people,
their language and traditional way of life. Yet, such progress has not been
suﬃcient to remediate the historical inequality the Sámi people have faced,
and have not evolved to protect them from new challenges, such as those
provoked by the negative impacts of industrial development on their traditional
lands. While it is important to reform legislative and political frameworks
to guarantee the human rights of the Sámi people, the autonomy and self-
governance powers of the Sámi parliaments must also be strengthened in
order to ensure the right of the Sámi people to self-determination.
The right of the Sámi people to self-determination is an essential feature of
their human rights and is the basis for their inclusion in the democratic orders
that govern them. As noted by both the former and current Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, there is an ongoing need to strengthen
the Sámi Parliament’s ability to participate in and genuinely inﬂuence decision-
making in matters that aﬀect the Sámi people (Anaya 2011, para. 37). In
Finland and Sweden for instance, the Sámi Parliament does not have sub-
stantial inﬂuence or decision-making powers. Whereas in Finland the Sámi
parliament has limited advising powers, in Sweden, the Sámi Parliament
functions as both a popularly elected body and a State administrative agency
which includes an obligation of the Sámi parliament to implement policies
and decisions made by the Swedish Parliament and government institutions.
This can be problematic, however, when decisions made by the Swedish
Parliament do not reﬂect the view and interests of the Sámi people. In
Norway, substantial progress has been made, especially since the Norwegian
government has ratiﬁed Convention ILO 169 concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples, and adopted a consultative agreement in 2005 to strengthen the
political inﬂuence of the Sámi Parliament in political processes (Falch et al.
2016). Yet, in its 2016 report, the current Special Rapporteur, Tauli-Corpuz,
noted that Norway should ‘enhance eﬀorts to implement the right of the Sámi
people to self-determination and to more genuinely inﬂuence decision-making
in areas of concern to them’ (Tauli-Corpuz 2016, para. 76). In particular, she
advised the need for a more eﬀective consultation arrangement, which should
also cover budgetary decisions. The following recommendations have, however,
not yet been addressed by the Norwegian government.
In Russia, indigenous peoples have also called for ‘greater democracy and
participation’ (Prakhova 2005). In eﬀect, the situation for the Sámi people
and other indigenous communities living in the country is even more alarming
than it is in the Nordic states. This is in spite of the guarantees provided by
the Russian Federation for the rights of small indigenous peoples under
Article 69 of the Constitution. In its 2014 report, the HRC indicated for
instance that it remains concerned regarding insuﬃcient measures taken to
respect and protect the rights of indigenous peoples, and to ensure that
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members of such peoples are recognised as indigenous in Russia. In its report,
the HRC stressed particular emphasis on the lack of protections for the tradi-
tional lands and sacred areas of indigenous peoples, which are ‘unprotected
from desecration, contamination and destruction by extractive, development
and related activities’. In addition, it also emphasised ‘that consultation with
indigenous peoples on matters of interest to their communities is insuﬃciently
enforced in practice and that access to eﬀective remedies remains a challenge’
(HRC 2015, para. 23). This is the case for Nenets in Russia, where the develop-
ment of extractive industry operations continues to undermine the traditional
way of life of Nenets people, and activities continue without obtaining the
free, prior and informed consent of the concerned communities for most
proposed projects. Thus, there is a need for new governmental measures in
order to eﬀectively ensure the accommodation of the rights of indigenous
peoples at the domestic level, and especially to ensure their right to self-
determination, including their right to fully and meaningfully participate in
the management of their land and territories.
Additionally, this extends to the right of indigenous peoples to represent
their own interests through their own and truly representative organisations.
The closure and reform of RAIPON, the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East, because of an ‘alleged lack of
correspondence between the association’s statutes and federal law’ have sparked
major reactions both regionally and internationally. Today, it is still questioned
whether the organisation operates under free and genuine indigenous control
(International Work Group for Indigenous Aﬀairs 2012). In the absence of
representative institutions, the situation of indigenous peoples’ rights is at risk
of further erosion in Russia.
Finally, while the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples occurs
primarily at the domestic level, it is also important for indigenous representatives
to be included in the decision-making processes that operate on regional and
international levels. In the Barents Region, indigenous peoples have strength-
ened their inﬂuence in decision-making processes aﬀecting them through their
participation in the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. The working
group consists of the representatives of the Sámi, Nenets and Veps peoples. It
was established as a means to recognise the speciﬁc needs and interests of
indigenous peoples living in the Barents Region. The working group has a
speciﬁc position within the Barents cooperation framework; in addition to its
operational role as a working group, it also has an advisory role to both the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council
(BRC) (Working Group of Indigenous Peoples – BEAC 2017). Through this
advisory function, the working group consequently has a political dimension.
It can inﬂuence the decisions made by the BRC and the BEAC to the extent
that the councils take its opinions into account. In addition, the working
group can also participate in all Barents working group sessions. However, the
working group solely oﬀers consultative status for indigenous peoples within
the Barents Councils institutions. Therefore, in order to enhance their rights
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to self-determination, the Sámi together with the Nenets and the Veps have
asked for permanent status within the Barents cooperation framework, as
opposed to simply being granted consultative status as a working group. The
status of permanent participant would aﬀord them direct representation
instead of indirect representation through a working group (BEAC Newsletter
2010). This way, indigenous peoples would be granted full and active partici-
pation within the BEAC and BRC as permanent participants, and, as they
argue, this status would be in line with their right to self-determination.
The above analysis makes explicit that the inclusion of indigenous peoples
in democratic governance remains an on-going issue in the Barents Region,
both at the domestic and regional level. In order to ensure political security for
all peoples in the Barents Region, it is consequently important that governance
institutions at the local, national and regional levels recognise their land and
cultural rights, promote inclusion and foster their full self-determination and
participation in democracy as valued members of national societies and the
regional Barents community.
3.3 Peace and stability
Political security is conditional to peace and stability. One of the best indicators
for political insecurity in a country is the priority the government accords to
military strength (UNDP 1994, 32). During the Cold War, the Barents Region
was an area of military confrontation and therefore possessed a high level of
human insecurity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibilities for
military conﬂict to take place in the region declined. The development of
cooperation in the region also largely contributed to enhancing the peace and
stability of the region. However, although it is unlikely that a conﬂict could
start in the region, there are concerns that the region could be aﬀected by
geopolitical tensions elsewhere. In particular, Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
and its involvement in the conﬂict in Ukraine in 2014, have resulted in a
strained relationship between the Nordic countries and the Russian government,
which could threaten the peaceful state of aﬀairs in the Arctic (Rahbek-
Clemmensen 2017). Although it is diﬃcult to assess the full impact of such
tensions for the Barents Region, the following subsection attempts to address
some aspects relating to the peace and stability of the region.
As mentioned elsewhere in this book, the Ukrainian conﬂict increased
political tensions between all Arctic countries. After the annexation of Crimea,
the United States and the European Union enacted sanctions on Russian
individuals and businesses, which were also reciprocated by Russian counter
measures. Several types of sanctions have been imposed on Russia. The sanc-
tions include asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities that have
been involved or have beneﬁted from Russia’s actions in Ukraine, sectoral
sanctions targeting the oil and gas, defence and ﬁnancial sectors in Russia,
and an arms embargo restrictions on doing business and investing in Russian-
occupied Crimea. In addition, the sanctions also prohibit American and EU
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companies from providing equipment and expertise to complex deep-water,
Arctic and shale oil development projects in Russia. While the impact of the
sanctions on Russian resources business remains limited – gas production and
exports have fallen slightly and oil production remains unaﬀected for the time
being8 – the impact of ﬁnancial sanctions has been immediate and signiﬁcant.
In particular, sanctions contributed to the collapse of the Russian ruble and
the Russian ﬁnancial crisis. With the impact of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, such
sanctions have isolated Russia from the global economy and held back its
economic modernisation (EU Parliament 2016). Furthermore, it has also
been reported that sanctions caused economic damage to a number of EU
countries, with total losses estimated at €100 billion. In the Barents Region,
Norway was particularly aﬀected by the sanctions on Russia, with a drop by
28% year-on-year to a total of €672 million in the ﬁrst half of 2015 and a
major export decline, though Russian trade to Norway in the period increased
by 10% to a total of €586 million (Staalesen 2015).
Despite economic tensions and little political contact since 2014, coopera-
tion between Norway and Russia in the north has continued at the regional
level. Most notably, the Barents cooperation has continued to operate in areas
such as ﬁsheries, border control, environment and nuclear safety. Broader
people-to-people contact networks between Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and the
northern parts of the Nordic countries have also been maintained. In fact,
maintaining good relations in the Barents Region despite tensions in bilateral
relations has been an objective for all governments. The importance of preser-
ving cooperation in the Barents Region despite major geopolitical turmoil was
also noted by the head of the Barents Regional Council, Arkhangelsk Governor
Igor Orlov, who ‘told his Oblast government in September 2014 that compli-
cated geopolitics should not aﬀect Barents Cooperation’ (Nilsen 2017). In
practice, the organisation of a series of high-level talks in the Barents-Euro
Council after the annexation of Crimea underscores that mutual interests in
the region have continued to guide cooperation in the region. As such, while
media headlines speculated great potential for conﬂicts in the Barents-Arctic,
a common understanding of joint interests in maintaining dialogue has
contributed to preserving the peace and stability within the region.
In addition, military activities within the region do not currently constitute
a threat for its stability. Even though the activities of NATO and Russia outside
the Barents have raised some concerns, it must also be noted that NATO does
not have a strong presence in the Arctic. After the end of the Cold War,
NATO’s focus gradually shifted away from the Arctic to strengthen its role in
the Mediterranean and more recently in the Eastern part of Europe. While a
signiﬁcant part of the region is within the territory of NATO members,
NATO does not have a speciﬁc Arctic policy and therefore no clear role in the
region. Nonetheless, following the Ukrainian crisis, the possibility and the
importance of enhancing the presence of NATO in the region has been ques-
tioned. According to Øystein Bø (2016), State Secretary of the Norwegian
Ministry of Defence, a strong NATO presence in the North would be in the
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US’ and Norway’s interests. On the other hand, it has been stressed that the
purpose of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Barents does not inevitably
aspire to revive or hearten conﬂict in the region. As noted by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg in his 2016 speech, ‘NATO does not seek con-
frontation with Russia’. NATO ‘does not want a new Cold War’ nor ‘wants a
new arms race’. Rather, its ‘aim is a more positive and a more cooperative
relationship with Russia’ (Stoltenberg 2016). In this regard, it is also sug-
gested that an increasing NATO presence does not necessarily mean an
increased focus on hard security issues. Instead, it has been suggested that
NATO would focus on ‘soft security’ issues including the ecological con-
sequences of global warming and the risk of manmade and environmental
disasters (Sergunin 2015, 110). Although this focus does not exclude military
components of NATO policy, as reﬂected in a series of exercises conducted
under the NATO allegiance, Sergunin argues that NATO reinforced involve-
ment in the Arctic would principally target human activities and the global
competition for resources (Sergunin 2015, 110). As such, the strengthening of
NATO presence and military activities would not necessarily constitute a
factor of insecurity for its population but perhaps could provide a means to
increase political security in the region.
Yet, relations between Russia and the Nordic countries remain compli-
cated and inﬂuenced by larger geopolitical developments, especially in the
domain of military activities occurring outside the Barents Region. In 2013,
Russia’s Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, indicated during the Barents
Summit in Kirkenes ‘that Moscow sees the Arctic as an area with good
opportunities to implement joint programs and initiatives’ (Nilsen 2017).
However, he also underlined that ‘any expansion of NATO to include
Sweden and Finland would upset the balance of power and force Russia to
respond’. With Finland and Sweden strengthening their ties to NATO and
growing speculation around joining the Alliance, Russia continues to warn
that they would be forced to take a military response if such a situation
materialised, without however, clarifying the extent to which such a response
would entail (O’Dwyer 2016). Currently, it also remains questionable whe-
ther Sweden and Finland would compromise their non-alignment policy. In
2016, Margot Wallstrom, Foreign Minister, indicated that these policies
have served them well until today and ‘contributes to stability and security
in northern Europe’ (Wallstrom 2016). However, Sweden military exercise
with US and NATO troops around the Baltic Sea island of Gotland in 2017
in response to large scale military exercises by Russia on the borders of Europe
have again raised the possibility of the country joining NATO. According to
the Swedish Defence Minister, the Swedish military exercise constitutes
‘important signal to the Swedish population and also to other countries and
partners that (they) take this security situation seriously’ (Hultqvist 2017).
Although those events demonstrate that the security situation in the vicinity
of the Nordic states have deteriorated since the Crimea crisis (Fiskvik 2016),
it nevertheless remains diﬃcult to prognosticate to which extent those
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developments will aﬀect more generally the stability of the Barents Region
and its population.
In any event, ensuring peace and stability requires the maintenance of dia-
logue between all national governments, in particular concerning military
activities in order to ensure that regional military activities do not jeopardise
cooperation in the Barents. In addition, it is also important to ensure trans-
parency in military exercises along national borders and to ensure the provi-
sion of necessary information to all concerned parties. An increase in Russian
unannounced military exercises since 2014 have raised concerns regarding the
Russian government’s lack of clear expression on its motivations (NATO’s
Timo Koster and US deputy permanent representative to NATO Earle
Litzenberger in Gronning and Norwegian Institute of Foreign Aﬀairs Con-
ference 2016). In this regard, it is generally agreed that more ‘stability, pre-
dictability and cooperation with Russia is needed in the Arctic’ (Gronning
and Norwegian Institute of Foreign Aﬀairs Conference 2016). Whether these
goals are achievable with a more involved NATO in the region is, however,
still contested (Gronning and Norwegian Institute of Foreign Aﬀairs Con-
ference 2016). As a result, monitoring the development of peaceful military
relations and activities in the Barents should continue in order to ensure that
cross-border cooperation and the promotion of human security prevail in the
future.
4 Conclusions
With the establishment of the Barents cooperation and the development of
cross-borders relations between peoples and institutions since the 1990s, the
Barents Region has become one of the most peaceful and stable regions in
the world.
Yet, the political security of the Barents population is not unchallenged. As
previously discussed, beyond peace and stability, political security necessarily
involves guaranteeing the democratic governance of states and human rights
of the population. In the Barents Region, there is an excellent level of pro-
tection aﬀorded to the individual political rights of citizens living in the
Nordic countries, but mediocre guarantees provided for those living in Russia.
There are also concerns in both countries about the level of participation in
electoral activities, which constitutes the primary medium to ensure the exercise
of democracy. Finally, there is also a clear lack of political freedom in Russia
and a lag in the rights to free press, association and assembly, which in turn
constrain democracy and political security in this part of the region. In this
regard, there is a clear and urgent need for the promotion, enhancement and
assurance of basic human rights and political freedoms in the Barents Region
for all citizens.
Additionally, the present analysis has also demonstrated that political
security in the Barents Region concerns the inclusion of indigenous peoples in
the political and democratic order of the Barents Region. For many decades,
182 Dorothée Cambou
indigenous peoples have been colonised, marginalised and forcibly assimilated
by their states. Today, they continue to suﬀer from the grievous consequences
of historical injustices and contemporary challenges, which include the lack of
inclusion in decision-making processes aﬀecting them and the exploitation of
their traditional lands and resources. Fuelling more support to indigenous
representative institutions through the recognition of their rights to self-
determination is therefore fundamental to increasing political security in
the Barents Region. In particular, the ratiﬁcation of ILO Convention 169 and
the adoption of the Nordic Sámi Convention would be key elements to
enhance the political and legislative framework of all the Barents states con-
cerning the rights of the Sámi people. While the Barents institutions have already
recognised the speciﬁc status of indigenous peoples through the establishment
of the working group on indigenous peoples, strengthening the role and
inﬂuence of this mechanism would also be a means to increase the inclusion
of indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes aﬀecting them at the
regional level. Ultimately, there is a pressing need to adopt a holistic per-
spective towards the rights of indigenous peoples in order to ensure that their
political security is equally ensured in the Barents Region.
Finally, preserving peace and stability in the region is also required. Political
security remains indeed conditional to peace and stability. Whereas it is unlikely
that conﬂicts would resurface in the Barents Region (Rahbek-Clemmensen
2017), reinforcing dialogue and cooperation between concerned actors and
strengthening transparency and predictability in the ﬁeld of military activities
remains necessary both within and outside the Barents Region. While coop-
eration in the Barents Region has been maintained despite the Ukrainian
crisis, recent events have raised some tensions and concerns regarding military
relations and its signiﬁcance for the region. In this context, maintaining
peaceful military relations between states must continue in order to ensure
that cross-border cooperation and the improvement of human security prevail
in the region.
Notes
1 European Court of Human Rights, Hokkanen v. Finland, 24 August 1994.
2 XII Session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Joint communique,Murmansk, 15
October 2009; XV Session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Oulu, 15 October 2015.
3 Patchwork Barents, http://patchworkbarents.org/, last visited on 17-07-2017
4 NRK, Norwegian Result, www.nrk.no/norge/resultater-valg-2015-1.12499895, last
visited on 17-07-2017.
5 Golos was awarded the Sakharov Prize its ‘outstanding eﬀorts to promote democratic
values through free and fair elections’ by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee in 2012.
6 BEAC Committee of Senior Oﬃcials 2008.
7 Norwegian Government, NOU 2001: 03, www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/dok/
nouer/2001/nou-2001–03.html?id=143453, last visited on 17–07–2017.
8 However, it is stated that oil export earnings have dropped signiﬁcantly but this is
certainly due to lower oil prices. In 2016, Russian oil companies were planning to
export 6% less than in 2015, (EU Parliament, 2016).
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